Adapting to a Crisis | How Elena Luneva (General Manager, Nextdoor) Pivoted Strategies During A Crisis
How a first-principles approach led Nextdoor champion the needs of it’s customers during a crisis, and emerge stronger.
When COVID-19 shut down cities overnight, local businesses faced a crisis that threatened their survival. For Nextdoor, the impact to the local advertising and offers business was immediate and severe. Fifty percent of local business vanished overnight, and the new SMB acquisition motion stalled.
In this conversation, Elena Luneva, former GM of Local Business at Nextdoor, shares how her team pivoted away from performance marketing to partnerships and PR, and shipped new products to meet the moment and support struggling merchants. She discusses the difficult decisions made, the lessons learned, and what she’s learned about adapting to a crisis.
Prasid: Can you set the stage: just before the crisis, what did Nextdoor look like? What was your role and focus?
Elena: At the time Nextdoor was a pre-IPO growth-stage company. I was the GM responsible for the local business vertical. And then, overnight, 50% of local businesses just shut down. Walking down Fillmore Street in San Francisco, seeing my favorites boarded-up, dim-lights, empty streets—it was devastating.
I was responsible for local business growth targets in the run-up to the IPO. But in a world where half the local businesses were shutting down overnight, we needed to completely rethink our approach—fast.
We had built our marketing strategy heavily around performance marketing, paid ads on Meta, and local outreach efforts. And suddenly, that playbook needed to be thrown out. Small businesses were in survival mode, and the usual conversion tactics—bringing them onto Nextdoor—weren’t viable.
Prasid: So let’s backtrack and share some more context on Nextdoor. My understanding is that initially, Nextdoor wasn’t focused on local businesses. It was focused on neighbor connection, supported by national advertisers.
Elena: Yes. We built the neighbor community product for years. What we started noticing in the data was that local businesses wanted to advertise—but initially, our system blocked these posts as spam. We realized there was a real need for local businesses to connect with neighbors, and an appetite for this connection from neighbors, if done tactfully. One thing I’ve learned in my career: when people start hacking your product, it’s a strong signal that there’s an unmet demand. If you can figure out how to make it valuable for the entire ecosystem, it can become a highly lucrative business line—and that’s exactly what happened with local businesses on Nextdoor.
I was hired to scale that local business line from 0 as the GM.
We built out an onboarding experience that allowed businesses to:
Represent themselves on the platform
Post directly in the neighborhood feed and engage with neighbors
Create deals and promotions (e.g., “Buy your first coffee, get the second one free”)
As of the IPO, the local ads business had grown to 30% of Nextdoor’s revenue. Even more importantly, local businesses added value to the community: when neighbors engaged positively with businesses, they strengthened the whole ecosystem.
Prasid: Wow so the local merchant business unit was actually pretty built-out.
Prasid: So you mentioned 30% of the revenue is already coming from this new business unit. Let’s make sure we’re clear on where the other 70% was coming?
Elena: Our core business was selling ads to large enterprise brands that wanted to engage local communities—for example, home insurance companies, meal kit delivery services, CPG and other big brands.
But my business unit was more like Yelp on the local scale, trying to acquire local merchants and creating neighbor engagement products for them.
To acquire merchants we had a market-based approach similar to Lyft and Square, and were using performance marketing and feet-on-the-street direct outreach:
Liquidity: Focus on getting merchant penetration within specific markets.
Acquisition: Get businesses to create an organic business listing on the platform.
Conversion: Convert those merchants through post, deal and neighborhood sponsorship products.
ROAS (Return on Ad Spend): Optimize to generate paying merchants.
Prasid: Tell me more about the types of local engagement products you were building.
Elena: We tailored engagement products to the types of local merchants.
For a coffee shop, as an example, local deals drove engagement.
For a real estate agent, we introduced opportunities to “Sponsor a Neighborhood” and appear in the real estate map and various placements in the feed.
For plumbers we introduced a post type to showcase their projects.
One of our biggest product marketing challenges was positioning the ad products for an SMB buyer. Small businesses don’t think in terms of CAC; they think in terms of their craft and community connection. So we couldn’t just say “lower CAC.” Instead, we had to frame it in words and outcomes relevant to the local business, for example: “Get access to 3,000 neighbors in Larkspur and Tiburon.”
To maintain a balance between supply and demand, we launched one market at a time. For example, for the deals product to have perceived value, a neighborhood “Deals” page would need at least 10 active deals listed.
Prasid: How many markets were you in at this point?
Elena: We were already nationwide.
The COVID-19 Crisis: A Need to Pivot
Prasid: Great so now we have some background on the two business units, and what products and acquisition channels your Local Business unit was leveraging. Now let’s go back to when the crisis hit. You described walking down Fillmore Street and seeing the boarded-up storefronts. Take us into that moment—what was going through your mind as a leader responsible for local business growth? How did you balance the emotional weight of seeing businesses struggle with the need to quickly pivot strategy?
Elena: It was heartbreaking. On one hand, the board understood what was happening—we were in a crisis, and no one expected business as usual. But on the other hand, there were still numbers to hit, revenue expectations to meet and a business to run.
But it wasn’t just about lost revenue, it was about people’s livelihoods and how they could support their families. It was about the loss of everyday creature comforts—the spot where people grabbed lunch, shops that had been there for years and a key part of what made my neighborhood what it was. And we had to ask ourselves: How do we help these businesses survive? What role could Nextdoor play in keeping communities thriving during this time? And that was the perspective I took on as a leader. How can I help?
Up to that point we’d been focused on acquisition: boots-on-the-ground sales teams, pushing businesses to tip a neighborhood by getting a critical mass onto the platform. As COVID-19 hit we couldn’t send people out on the street. And we couldn’t keep pouring money into performance marketing, conversion rates were tanking. We unexpectedly hit the flatline of the conversion curve, it just fell off a cliff.
So we made three changes:
We paused performance marketing to preserve capital.
We shifted from a sales-led approach to partnerships and PR.
We pivoted our local business team to launch a local business bundle, giving local businesses tools to survive.
The New Strategy: Supporting Local Businesses
Prasid: Walk us through the solution you implemented. What exactly did you do, and who was involved?
Elena: We completely pivoted our product roadmap. Our goal was to get money into the pockets of the remaining local businesses right now, even if they couldn’t physically open or adjust how they did business. One way to do that was gift cards.
The idea was simple: give customers a way to support their favorite local businesses today, and redeem later when things reopen. Another solution was to help dine-in restaurants pivot to offering delivery.
So we built a business bundle that allowed local merchants to:
Add gift card, delivery, and donation links to their profiles.
Easily integrate with DoorDash, Uber Eats, GoFundMe, and OpenTable.
Pause advertising payments for existing merchant subscribers if they needed financial relief.
We also changed our GTM strategy. Instead of trying to acquire businesses one-by-one through sales, we leveraged partnerships. And we used PR to amplify the message.
We leaned into touchless delivery and fast-casual dining, knowing that consumer behavior was shifting toward safety and convenience.
Prasid: A lot of online platforms (e-commerce, stock trading, etc.) saw a huge surge in consumer traffic during COVID-19. Did you experience that?
Elena: Yes—there was huge growth in neighbor engagement. Nextdoor became the go-to platform for how communities stayed connected.
One of our other business unit’s key investments was in the Help Map, which allowed neighbors to volunteer to help each other—whether that meant picking up groceries, delivering medicine, or running essential errands for someone who couldn’t leave their home.
We grew to be in 1 out of every 3 households—that gave us an opportunity to become the local channel for information and support.
Not every business was able to use or wanted to use existing delivery and fundraising platforms like GoFundMe, Uber Eats, or Treat, so we had to find ways to bridge the gap.
Prasid: How did you get businesses to opt in? How did you pre-populate these features for them?
Elena: Normally, these kinds of tools would be part of a paid ad product—but we made them free.
We templatized everything—creating a simple, seamless way for businesses to add gift card options, delivery links, and donation requests to their profiles.
But there was still something missing—the right partnerships to fully connect the experience. We had the infrastructure, but we needed external platforms to complete the loop and ensure businesses could easily integrate with existing payment and delivery systems.
The Role of PR & Partnerships
Prasid: Since you pivoted away from performance marketing, what role did PR play in getting the word out? Were there specific campaigns or media strategies that helped amplify this initiative?
Elena: Performance marketing wasn’t viable anymore—RoAS was dropping, and businesses were pulling back on ad spend. We needed to preserve capital, but we also had to find a way to support businesses in real time. We saw a clear shift in business needs—restaurants couldn’t allow dine-in customers, so they pivoted to delivery and touchless dining options. At the same time, many businesses needed direct financial support, so platforms like GoFundMe became crucial.
Nextdoor already had a presence in one out of every four households, so our role became connecting businesses with neighbors. We added new functionality to enable businesses to add a GoFundMe donation link in their profile description and help restaurants transition to delivery by partnering with Uber Eats and similar platforms. And if they were already listed on those platforms, we offered businesses the option to opt-in to featuring those adjusted capabilities.
Once these features were live, PR became a critical channel for driving awareness. We focused on human-centric stories starring small businesses persevering through COVID, adjusting their strategy to survive, and built a three-pronged announcement strategy:
Community announcements on the Nextdoor platform to engage neighbors.
Press releases and media outreach to amplify how we were supporting businesses.
Joint announcements with delivery and fundraising partners to expand reach and credibility.
This approach ensured businesses actually knew these tools were available and could start using them immediately to stay afloat.
Prasid: That’s so interesting. Was there money changing hands in these partnerships? It sounds like a great distribution channel for Uber Eats.
Elena: No, I don’t believe any money was changing hands between Nextdoor and Uber Eats.
The way it worked was:
Nextdoor integrated with Uber Eats, allowing small businesses to add an “Order Delivery” or “Buy a Gift Card” button to their profiles.
Merchants on Nextdoor could enable these options, making it easier for customers to support them.
Neighbors browsing Nextdoor would see these new options—allowing them to order directly from a small business or purchase a gift card, powered by Uber Eats or engage with donation links powered by GoFundMe.
For businesses already on Nextdoor, we could pre-populate their profiles with these features. For businesses not yet on the platform, it was an easy on-ramp—they’d join and immediately benefit from the visibility of the joint campaign.
While it was a valuable partnership for all sides, I don’t believe there was direct revenue-sharing or payments between Nextdoor and partners—this was more about expanding reach and driving engagement together in support of local businesses.
This was in stark contrast to Yelp, which also introduced donation links for small businesses during the pandemic—but with one key difference: they didn’t notify businesses or give them a choice to opt out.
When Nextdoor launched the functionality to help businesses offer delivery and gift cards, we didn’t just turn it on and assume everyone would want it. Instead, we:
Talked with businesses first
Proactively informed businesses about the new feature
Allowed them to opt in, rather than being automatically enrolled
By giving businesses control, Nextdoor built stronger long-term engagement and trust, ensuring businesses felt like partners, not just users on a platform.
Prasid: What role did PR play? How did you use storytelling to amplify this initiative?
Elena: We leaned into local storytelling. One moment that stood out—I took a picture of my daughter getting ice cream delivered from Fillmore Creamery. That small, everyday experience, that became such a luxury. I can still see her smile in my mind. That’s exactly what we were fighting to preserve—the moment of happiness that local businesses bring.
So PR focused heavily on local news outlets and individual business stories. Our team worked closely with employees and neighbors, listening for specific local narratives that resonated with communities.
A big part of this was social listening—we had a team dedicated to surfacing the most compelling stories and making sure they got in front of the right media outlets.
At the end of the day, we weren’t just another platform—we were the local social network. That positioning helped us rally communities and get real traction and money into local business pockets when they needed help from their neighbors most.
Navigating Internal Challenges
Prasid: Partnerships were a key part of this pivot. How did you make this happen so quickly?
Elena: A lot of it came down to relationships. Adel Farahmand was instrumental in making sure we had the right partnerships in place. As a GM, you have to ensure both R&D and GTM are hand-in-glove rather than tossing things over the fence—it’s not just about building a product but also making sure it actually reaches the businesses that need it.
We initially explored working with OpenTable, but the integration proved challenging. The focus for OpenTable was high-end restaurants and it took time for many of them to pivot to delivery. So we had to pivot and find partners that could move faster from a technology and API perspective.
Prasid: Tell us more about the org structure. Were advertising, partnerships, and PR part of your team, or did you have to work cross-functionally? If they were outside teams, how did you navigate internally to get their focus on this initiative?
Elena: Execution was spread across multiple teams under the broader marketing org with a dotted line to EPD (Engineering, Product and Design) so we really had to work cross-functionally.
Zooming-out, this pivot required a company-wide strategic decision—do we divert resources toward a crisis response, or do we stay the course?
We had three possible paths:
Continue as-is – Stick to the original plan, even though businesses were shutting down.
Do nothing – Turn off marketing spend entirely, preserve capital, and shift our focus away from small businesses toward large advertisers.
Do something for small-businesses – Invest in supporting local businesses, even though it was an unknown bet. The thinking being that if these businesses survived, they’d become long-term customers.
We chose #3—but that required getting alignment across Product, Finance, Operations, and Marketing.
Prasid: You were pivoting and shipping fast. How did you get alignment across teams?
Elena: Alignment was critical. This wasn’t just a marketing challenge; it was a cross-functional shift that required buy-in from Product, Finance, Operations, and GTM teams.
The key was clear decision-making frameworks and rapid scenario planning. We didn’t have months to figure this out—we needed to move yesterday.
Prasid: What were the guiding principles in making these calls?
Elena: We had to ask:
What are we modeling? Are we optimizing for short-term revenue or long-term engagement?
What’s the role of Product? Just because we could build something didn’t mean we should—every feature had financial implications.
What do we stand for? Do the values we have as a company mean something?
Prasid: How did you communicate this shift to stakeholders, investors, and the team? Did you face any hesitations or pushback?
Elena: The biggest challenge was navigating uncertainty. We were making a big bet on local businesses at a time when 50% had already shut down, and more were projected to, indefinitely. Internally, stakeholders were asking:
Why not focus on enterprise customers instead?
Should we just preserve capital and wait?
How do we know this pivot will work?
We had to frame the decision in clear, logical terms—showing both the risk and the opportunity.
To get buy-in, we modeled multiple financial scenarios—best-case, worst-case, and middle-ground projections. We also had to ensure cross-functional alignment, especially with finance and operations.
Instead of focusing on immediate revenue, we prioritized customer retention and support—keeping businesses engaged with Nextdoor and focusing on trust, so they would choose to work with us as conditions improved.
This shift wasn’t just about survival; it was about long-term positioning and how we wanted to show up—helping businesses weather the storm so they’d trust and invest in Nextdoor when they were ready. We were in it together.
Results & Lessons Learned
Prasid: Looking back at this initiative, what were the biggest takeaways? What impact did this strategy have—not just on revenue, but on how businesses engaged with Nextdoor in the long run?
Elena: We stemmed the exodus of businesses from our platform and positioned Nextdoor as a trusted pro-local business brand. The strategy delivered meaningful results in several ways:
Prevented mass attrition – Helped retain businesses on the platform even when they couldn’t afford advertising.
Strengthened brand positioning – Nextdoor became the local platform that supported businesses when they needed it most.
Met urgent customer needs – Provided an immediate, tangible solution during a crisis.
Maintained long-term relationships – By allowing businesses to pause subscriptions while still benefiting from the platform, we ensured they stayed engaged for the long run and turned to us first when things improved.
This wasn’t just about revenue—it was about trust and long-term relationships. Businesses remembered who showed up for them in a crisis, and that mattered when the market started to bounce back.
Prasid: In hindsight, what worked best and what didn’t? What were the key takeaways from this experience?
Elena:
What worked:
Partnerships let us scale without huge acquisition costs.
PR drove massive organic engagement.
Giving businesses control helped build long-term trust.
What didn’t work as well:
Some integrations, like OpenTable, never materialized for delivery since high-end restaurants weren’t structured for takeout.
Adoption of gift cards took longer than expected—people weren’t used to buying them online.
Prasid: If you could focus your Product and Engineering teams on something else, what might you have done instead?
Elena: I think we should have prioritized two things:
Expanding the Help Map – As a reminder this was a map where neighbors could raise their hand when they needed help, and other neighbors could volunteer to help them. For example someone immuno-compromised needed help picking up groceries. This feature had incredible organic traction. Had we focused on scaling it earlier, we could have driven more scaled and immediate impact to communities.
Building a resource center for business owners – A centralized hub with grants, government aid, and practical survival tools might have been more valuable than direct giving from neighbors.
Ultimately, this experience reinforced a key lesson: Sticking to the company values, doing what’s right for your customers is always the right solution, the revenue will follow.
Final Thoughts
Prasid: You’ve talked about how this experience shaped your perspective on GTM strategy. I know you also have taught growth and product management with both Reforge and Maven. How did going through this crisis inform your course?
Elena: This crisis reinforced something I had learned over 20 years in product leadership: GTM matters as much as the product itself. A lot of PMs operate with the “if we build it, they will come” mindset—but that’s rarely how things actually work. Aligning PM+GTM into a partnership ensures that the company builds the right products that customers buy that move the business forward.
My upcoming course Go-to-Market Strategy for Product Leaders focuses on four areas:
Go-To-Market Strategy – Understanding ICP (Ideal Customer Profile), positioning, and reaching buyers effectively.
Financial Acumen – How to model metrics, talk about product impact in a way that your CFO understands, and ensure pricing and revenue models make sense.
Executive Presence & Storytelling – How to frame key product metrics in a compelling way to drive alignment across leadership.
Growth Engine & AI Leverage – How to use AI to automate and streamline GTM communication, making messaging to stakeholders more effective.
The course is built around real-world case studies, including deep dives into successful execution in the four key leadership areas.
Prasid: If other startups face a similar crisis in the future, what key learnings would you share?
Elena: This experience shaped how I think about growth and marketing in a crisis.
Throw out the playbook when needed. Pivot fast—sometimes the only way forward is a completely new strategy. We moved from a sales-heavy model to a partnership-led one almost overnight.
Leverage partnerships over direct acquisition. Instead of costly performance marketing, we scaled through strategic alliances.
Empower businesses, don’t force them. Unlike Yelp’s auto-enrollment, we let businesses opt in, which builds long-term trust.
Prioritize immediate customer needs. Businesses didn’t need a SaaS tool; they needed cash flow. Suspending subscriptions and ad spend kept them engaged for the long haul.
At the end of the day, companies that put their customers first and adapt quickly will build the strongest relationships—and that’s what sustains a business beyond the crisis.
Elena Luneva is a Product, GTM and AI practitioner, with over 20 years in product leadership roles at GoFundMe, Braintrust, Nextdoor, LiquidSpace, OpenTable and BlackRock. She advises companies and teaches PMs to become impactful business leaders. Follow her writing on Substack and learn the skills that advance your career in the PM -> G(T)M course on Maven this April. Follow Elena on LinkedIn and read more of her insights on Substack.
Such a pleasure to share my story of partnership between product and gtm in serving the needs of our customers.